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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents a new security policy enforcer designed for securing parallel computation
on CUDA GPUs. We show how the very features that make a GPGPU desirable have already been
utilized in existing exploits, fortifying the need for security protections on a GPGPU. An aspect
weaver was designed for CUDA with the goal of utilizing aspect-oriented programming for security
policy enforcement. Empirical testing verified the ability of our aspect weaver to enforce various
policies. Furthermore, a performance analysis was performed to demonstrate that using this policy
enforcer provides no significant performance impact over manual insertion of policy code. Finally,
future research goals are presented through a plan of work. We hope that this thesis will provide
for long term research goals to guide the field of GPU security.
v
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
General Purpose Graphical Processing Unit (GPGPU) computation is a method of compu-
tation in which a Graphical Processing Unit (GPU) handles the processing that would traditionally
be done on a CPU. To properly explain software written for GPGPU, the architectural differ-
ences between traditional CPU based computing and GPU based computing needs to be explained.
This section will serve as a short introduction, where we will be comparing the different levels of
parallelism between code written for CPUs and GPUs.
A traditional single core CPU is classified as a Single Instruction Single Device (SISD)
device under Flynn’s taxonomy [11], which is a classification of computer architectures. In the
SISD classification of architectures, a CPU has a single processing stream for a single stream of
instructions running linearly on the processing core of the CPU. In order to manipulate a large
amount of data, a programmer can only use a loop or recursion. This process is done through
iterating along the entire data set, running the same instructions, repeatedly.
There is no hardware level parallelism implemented with the SISD classification of computer
architectures. A programmer is limited to running sequential code only if they wish to fully utilize
the underlying hardware of a SISD device. Thread level and instruction level parallelism can be
utilized with single core CPU’s to allow for multiple processes to run simultaneously. It is important
to note that this level of parallelism is performed through a layer of software-based scheduling and
in itself is not a hardware feature.
Modern CPUs have multiple cores running alongside each other, allowing a degree of hard-
ware level parallelism to the programmer. These processor cores share memory but are capable
of running on multiple separate streams of instructions, thus fitting the Multiple Instructions on
1
Multiple Data streams (MIMD) category under Flynn’s taxonomy. In order to utilize parallelism
with this style of programming, a developer must explicitly specify what each stream of instructions
should do. Also, there are concerns with the synchronization and creation of these threads to avoid
issues with concurrency such as deadlocking and resource starvation.
In terms of hardware design, multiprocessing can be complex and difficult to scale. A CPU’s
processing core is complex in design, thus limiting to the number of cores that can be placed in the
space of a single CPU package. For example, as of the time of this writing, a high-end desktop CPU
by Intel has four physical cores that have the capability of executing as two virtual cores each [15].
These eight virtual cores allow for only eight streams of instructions to run at the same time on
hardware. Multiple CPUs can be utilized in high-end computers or multiple computers can be ran
together in grid computers.
A GPU is normally used for rendering images onto a computer’s display. Rendering such
graphics would require relatively high-speed computations of a large number of vectors very rapidly.
In order to perform this computation quickly, GPUs are designed with a large number of processing
cores that are very small and efficient.
In a GPGPU, a single instruction stream is executed on many concurrent threads; thus
GPGPUs are classified as being Single Instruction Multiple Thread (SIMT) devices. The SIMT
classification is similar to the Single Instruction Many Data stream (SIMD) classification under
Flynn’s taxonomy. Both SIMD and SIMT send the same instruction to many execution units, but
in SIMT multithreading is combined with the SIMD model [24]. Having multithreading allows for
a GPGPU to execute more tasks than in a SIMD based device.
Each individual GPU cores does run slower than a core of a traditional CPU [26]. In spite of
the lower clock speed of the GPU cores, GPUs have a larger computational capability than CPUs.
This computational capability is due to the relatively large number of cores that are available.
As of the time of this writing, the highest-end GPU currently available from Nvidia has 3072
cores that are capable of running computations [28]. Each one of these cores has the capability of
running multiple threads themselves, which allows for the capability of a significantly higher level
of parallel computing in comparison with a regular CPU. Furthermore, multiple GPUs can easily
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be made to run alongside each other on a single computer, which can also increase the scale of
parallelism.
1.1 GPGPU Programming
Source Code nvcc splits
Device code
Host code
nvcc combines Executable
gcc
nv
cc
Figure 1.1. Steps to compile within nvcc.
The main existing tools for programming code that targets GPGPUs are OpenCL and
CUDA. These frameworks allow for a developer to write code that will run on a CPU as well as
the code that is expected to run, asynchronously, on the GPGPU. In these language frameworks,
special code must be written and called explicitly to be ran on the GPU. The CPU instructions
are written through a common procedural languages such as C or C++.
The GPU code is written through the stream programming paradigm [5]. In stream pro-
gramming, the code that run on the device are called kernels. These kernels are functions that run
on parallel GPU threads at the same time, with a different index on each thread. This is similar to
writing a body of a loop, but instead of the processor running the body once each iteration with a
different index, the entire loop runs at once on each GPU thread.
In the CUDA framework, these kernels are indexed through a hierarchy which can be
accessed through a three-component vector. Each component identifies the threads, thread blocks,
and the grid of blocks running on the system. Each grid holds a number of blocks which in turn
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holds a number of threads. Currently, GPUs which are CUDA capable, are limited to having 1024
threads per block as defined by their hardware design specifications [27].
The compiler used for CUDA code is called nvcc. This compiler’s front-end processes the
CUDA source code by initially separating the code based on where the execution should occur.
Next, regular code that should execute on a CPU is sent to an external C compiler, such as gcc,
to process what is called the host code. The GPU code is compiled through nvcc to generate what
is called the device code. Finally, nvcc combines the entire result into a single executable program.
Figure 1.1 demonstrates the compilation process under nvcc.
When CUDA code is processed, the host code instructs the GPUs with the commands to
run. The host code sends the device code over to the GPU through the system bus, which then
copies data to be processed into the GPU memory. Next, the GPU runs the device code as a
stream of instructions. When it is done, the results are copied back over the system bus to the host
memory of the CPU.
In CUDA, code to be run on the GPU device are identified in the source code by the
delimiters device and global . A function is callable from both the CPU host and other
devices if it is delimited by global . As for the device delimiter, this function is only callable
by code which is running on GPU devices; this code is not callable by a CPU host.
OpenCL is an open-source API that allows for a developer to define kernels to run on GPUs.
Being open-source, OpenCL is capable of running on GPUs and parallel processing units other than
those made by Nvidia. While CUDA is limited only to Nvidia GPUs, it has other performance
benefits with CUDA that make it more appealing to utilize [18].
1.2 Existing Attacks
Code written for an Nvidia GPU utilizes a proprietary assembly language whose code is
difficult to analyze due to the lack of accessible documentation. Also, since administrator privileges
are not needed to run GPU code, powerful malware can be made to execute on GPUs in order
to run without detection [30]. Moreover, since the majority of consumer computers are on x86
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based architectures, most malware analysis tools have been written for such an assembly language,
hindering any attempts to prevent GPU malware.
As a malware assistant, GPUs can be used to unpack malware that will run on a CPU in
order to avoid detection by malware analysis tools [41]. It is also possible for the GPU to be used
as a polymorphic malware extractor in order to further evasion from malware analysis tools. This
concern is a challenge for a security engineer to protect against due to the lack of existing tools to
enforce security policies on a GPU.
In the wild, GPUs have already been utilized for nefarious purposes. ESEA, a competitive
video game service, was found guilty of hiding a bitcoin miner on their client software [32]. This
miner utilized clients’ computers to mine bitcoin without the clients knowledge on their GPUs while
the client was waiting to start a game. The bitcoin miner introduced costly hardware damage to
users since the GPUs’ were made to run at higher loads than the clients would normally run their
GPUs, thus overheating the devices. Other malware can utilize this idea of GPU based bitcoin
mining to spread a botnet that would mine cryptocurrency for the malware writer at the price of
the infected users hardware and energy consumption.
Other potential attacks can also utilize a GPU. Since GPUs have a higher processing capa-
bility than a CPU, malware can use this high processing capability. An example of a utility of a
GPU for malware would be password cracking a user’s encrypted files without being detected as a
CPU process.
Memory on the GPU can be read allowing for an attacker to obtain information on a user’s
screen directly. Furthermore, this same memory can also be written to. As such it is possible to
render artifacts on a user’s screen to modify displayed content at will.
It was recently discovered that there was a bug in the Nvidia drivers where memory is
not freed after use [2]. A user discovered that information which was rendered in his private
incognito browsing instance was still available after closing his browser in the GPU memory. This
user successfully wrote a program to obtain information that was rendered previously in the video
buffer to verify the existence of this bug. Since the GPU did not clear memory correctly, it was
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possible for an attacker to obtain sensitive information from a user’s browsing history through
simply reading this memories contents.
Our review of the existing works presented in this section show that there is a need for
some mechanism to prevent the attacks mentioned above. Without knowledge of the assembly
language, a static analysis tool of compiled code would be a significant challenge to write. As such,
we propose that a language should be created to enforce security policies on CUDA source code.
1.3 Aspect-oriented Programming
This section provides a brief introduction to aspect-oriented programming. Aspect-oriented
programming is a programming paradigm that will be utilized throughout this thesis. Cross-cutting
concerns are the parts of a program that rely on, or are relied on, with many other components of
the program. In aspect-oriented programming, code is modularized by the cross-cutting concerns.
This paradigm will be utilized to simplify the insertion of security policy code into the target CUDA
source code.
In aspect-oriented programming, advice code is inserted into specific points called join-
points. The advice code is inserted onto the join-points through an aspect weaver. By having the
advice code be defined separately, it is easier for a developer to write easily maintainable code.
Ease of maintenance is a feature of aspect oriented programming. Since the developers can now
write software without concerning themselves with the contents of the advice code while focusing
on their designs. The terms and history of aspect-oriented programming are further discussed in
Section 2.3.
1.4 Contributions
Through the use of aspect-oriented programming techniques we will show in this thesis that
the definition and enforcement of, policies for Nvidia’s CUDA platform is possible to be done. The
main contributions of this thesis are:
1. The definition of simple aspect-oriented extensions to CUDA.
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2. Implementation of an aspect weaver for CUDA.
3. Using the aspect-oriented extensions to weave in code segments defined policies.
4. Demonstrating that these policies are successfully enforced.
1.5 Outline of Writing
Chapter 2 presents the reader with existing related work on security policies. We present
a system to enforce security policies on GPUs in Chapter 3. Examples of using the system created
in this thesis are provided in Chapter 4 along with a performance analysis of the effects introduced
by utilizing this system. In Chapter 5, we provide goals for future versions of the system which we
presented. Lastly, in Chapter 6, we present future work and summarize the thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
An overview of the existing works relating to security policy specification will be presented
in this chapter. Firstly, the scope of theoretical work involved with security policy studies will be
introduced. A survey of existing languages and tools for policy specification will be presented where
we shall show that there does not exist a tool suitable for the needs of GPGPU security. Lastly, we
will present in detail a useful programming paradigm that we have utilized for the system developed
in this thesis.
2.1 Security Policy Theory
Security policies are executions that are determined to be unacceptable by some pre-defined
rules. Enforceability theory is the study of what can and cannot be enforced as a policy through
policy enforcement mechanisms. These policies might relate to general purpose concepts such as
access control, information flow, and availability. System specific and special purpose policies are
very important utilities that would be used by a security engineer in order to define how a system
should behave.
An example of an application specific security policy is the traditional Unix file system
permission. These file system permissions enforce access control by checking the file system flags
and determining whether or not a user has the authority to read, write, or execute a file [31]. The
operating system that is enforcing this policy prevents any requests to files by users without the
correct permissions, thus preventing any unauthorized file accesses.
There are two classes of properties, these policies are known as safety and liveness proper-
ties [21]. Policies that specify that “nothing bad happens” are defined as safety properties. On the
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other hand, a liveness property is a policy which states that something “must” happen in order to
satisfy the policy’s requirements.
Schneider formalized program monitors and discovered limitations on them. Furthermore,
he presented a class of enforcement mechanisms that he defined as Execution Monitors [33]. This
class of monitors can only enforce safety properties. This class of enforcement mechanisms works
by monitoring the execution steps of a system which he defined to be the target. When the policy
was violated, the Execution Monitor would terminate this target system. In his work, he also
defined the class of security policies that are enforceable by Execution Monitors. Specifically, it
was established that mechanisms which use information that would be unavailable from monitoring
an executions trace are to be excluded from Execution Monitors.
From the definition provided by Schneider, Execution Monitors would not be capable of
enforcing a policy that requires knowledge of an execution’s future steps. As such, Schneider
excludes compilers, type checkers, and other forms of code static analysis from the Execution
Monitor family of enforcement mechanisms. This is because having knowledge of alternate paths
of code and future execution is the feature that invalidates the definition of these tools from being
Execution Monitor mechanisms.
For non-safety policies, Ligatti built on Scheider’s definition of policies [23]. Ligatti defined
the theoretical monitors as being modeled as edit automata. An edit automata is a transformer
of code which has the capability to insert, or suppress, actions on behalf of a target. Having this
capability allows for a remedial action to be specified for an execution instead of simply rendering
a trace as invalid. These remedial actions allow for liveness policies to also be enforced.
2.2 Policy Specification Languages
A number of policy definition tools already exist to specify and enforce security policies.
At the time of this writing, there was no security policy specification language in existence that
we have found that can be used for GPGPU computing. This section will introduce the scope of
research of policy specification languages and summarize selected languages.
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Polymer is a specification language and system for composable security policies in Java.
Polymer’s implementation deals with complex security policies by allowing a security engineer to
specify a security policy as the composition of smaller sub-policy modules for enforcing policies.
Polymer has three core abstractions: actions, suggestions, and policies [4]. The action objects
include all the information that is relevant to security sensitive method invocations. Suggestions
are used to suggest ways for the monitor to handle actions which trigger a policy constraint. The
policies are the monitors themselves that query actions, can accept suggestions, and then return a
result based on the suggestion.
Ponder2 is an object management system that allows for inter-object message passing in
a distributed system [40]. Based on an existing language, Ponder, the system Ponder2 aims to
incorporate events and policies to object management [9]. Policies in Ponder2 are defined to
the basic types being either obligation policies or authorization policies. Obligation policies are
actions that must be performed by the systems managers when an event occurs based on a set
of conditions. Authorization policies are simply rules to allow, or deny, message passing between
objects. An authorization policy is essentially an access control policy. In Ponder2, the policy can
either be designed to allow or deny.
Members of a system in Ponder2 are organized into domains. These domains simply act as
containers for objects in a hierarchy. Policies in Ponder2 are specified in terms of domains instead
of directly on the objects within a domain. When a policy is specified onto a domain, the same
policy is inherited to the sub-domains. However, when a domain has multiple parents, the domain
takes the most explicit policy and does not combine these policies.
The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language, XACML, is used for specifying access
control policies [14]. In XACML, a policy is defined with three components: a Target, a Rule set,
and a Rule combining algorithm. A XACML Target is defined as a set of requests to which the
policy applies. The Target can be inherited from the Parent policy if a XACML rule is formed
through combination. The Targets in XACML are defined statically. The rules in the rule set each
have another (optional) Target, Conditions, and Effects. The Condition defines what restrictions
are needed for the Effect to occur. XACML is limited as a policy language to simply permit or deny
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in access control as effects. It is also possible for a policy in XACML to include Obligations which
are functions to be executed that may affect the decision. Finally, the Rule combining algorithm
defines how to resolve conflicts when a policy is combined with another policy.
Run-time enforcement in a distributed system has used to enforce security policies. Other re-
search involved in the area of distributed security policies can be found in [39, 20, 38, 35, 34, 17, 10].
These works have defined how to communicate enforce security policies in a distributed environ-
ment. However, none of these works have defined policies, or policy enforcement mechanisms, for
GPGPUs.
2.3 Aspect-Oriented Programming
In order to allow for a developer to write the CUDA based code without having to concern
themselves with the security, we have decided to take an aspect-oriented programming approach.
This section will serve as an introduction to terms and concepts needed to explain aspect-oriented
programming, provide the background work for aspect-oriented programming, as well as attempts
to apply aspect-oriented programming to GPGPUs.
Aspect-oriented programming is a programming paradigm where a program is modularized
by its cross-cutting concerns. The concept of aspect-oriented programming was explicitly defined by
Kiczales in [19]. An example of aspect-oriented programming is an extension to the Java language
known as AspectJ [13]. In order to discuss aspect-oriented programming, related concepts will be
defined in his section.
When two properties that are being programmed have to be built differently, yet coordinated
in some way, there can be some difficulties with the interfacing of these properties. We say that
two properties cross-cut each other when they have to be coordinated in such ways.
If a property of a program can be fully expressed in a general procedure, it is defined as
a component. Components can be easily composed as needed and are easily accessible. These
components are considered to be individual units of a systems’ functionality.
In general purpose language paradigms, such as procedural or object oriented, a programmer
cannot build systems which cross-cut each other independently. This leads to difficulty for a
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programmer to compose two properties together without having the code tangled in difficulty to
decompose ways. The difficulty is because if the specifications change in any of the properties
that are the results of a composition, the programmer has manually decompose the components,
implement the modifications needed, finally recomposing the code.
Advice is any additional behavior that should be applied to the existing program. Advice
can be any behavior such as, but not limited to, additional code, performance or access patterns,
or even logging functions. In this paper, all of the policies to be implemented are considered to be
advice since they are going to be behavior added to an existing CUDA program.
A join-point is a point in a programs execution path where the code, advice, from an
aspect should be performed. The set of join-points is known as the point-cuts in aspect-oriented
programming.
The combination of join-points and advice are aspects. In order to place aspects in their
correct locations in code, an aspect weaver is used. An aspect weaver takes the set of aspect and
component programs outputs another program as output. This program would have all the advice
at the correct join-points in the flow graph.
In terms of the CUDA language framework, there has not been any existing implementa-
tions, as far as we are aware, where aspect-oriented programming was actually applied to CUDA.
The utility of aspect-oriented programming has been proposed as a desirable future feature for
CUDA to allow for performance benefits [29]. Also, aspect-oriented GPU programming has been
considered for simplifying programming through languages that output CUDA from object-oriented
languages such as in [12, 42, 25]. However, these existing works do not actually implement aspect-
oriented programming to existing CUDA code, but instead they take existing languages, which are
not CUDA, and use aspect-oriented programming techniques to output code that can be compiled
under a CUDA compiler.
There already exists an aspect-oriented programming implementation for the OpenCL
framework [8]. However, as far as my research has found, there is no available implementation
for CUDA code. Even though the OpenCL version can run on more hardware, we have chosen to
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continue the route of using CUDA due to the added performance of running CUDA code and due
to my familiarity with CUDA compared to OpenCL.
2.4 Chapter Summary
The related research has been described in this chapter in order to allow the reader to
familiarize themselves with the relevant terms and understand the current state of works of security
policy enforcement. Enforceability theory as a field has been deeply studied in the literature.
Many tools and languages exist for specifying security policies. From the set of policy
specification languages, none of the existing ones found have considered GPGPUs as a target
platform on which to enforce security policies.
Also, aspect-oriented programming as a paradigm was introduced with the terms defined
thoroughly. It was shown that aspect-oriented programming currently does not exist for CUDA.
Furthermore, it was demonstrated that there exists a desire for aspect-oriented programming for
CUDA for purposes outside of the needs of security policy specification.
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CHAPTER 3
PROPOSED SYSTEM
This chapter we will provide a detailed description of the main contributions proposed in
this thesis. The CUDA aspect weaver that we introduce will be introduced in this chapter. A list
of possible policy types for this system is defined. Also, the process of writing policies for this
CUDA aspect weaver will be explained. Finally, the development process of using this weaver with
existing CUDA code will be discussed.
3.1 The eGASP Policy Enforcement System
In order to enforce defined policies on a target CUDA program, it was decided to weave in
the policy code onto the source code of the target program and output a CUDA program which
has been enforced. This approach allows a CUDA developer to work independently of a policy
engineer as the policy code is kept separated from the target CUDA code. As was discussed
in Section 2.2, weaving code is a standard practice used for policy enforcement, e.g. the policy
enforcement mechanism in Polymer [4].
The name eGASP was chosen for this policy enforcer. This name is an acronym which stands
for “enforcing GPU policies through Aspect Style Programming”. The eGASP program will take
a gasp file and weave in the policies into the target code at specified join-points, locations in the
target code to insert aspect code, to enforce the specified policies.
This policy enforcer program was written using Python. Python was chosen to utilize
existing string manipulation libraries to inline the policies into a target CUDA device function. We
provide the full source code of eGASP online for use [1].
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Table 3.1: GASP policy types.
Policy type Join-point location.
Pre-execution Into the function at the beginning.
Pre-return Prior to all instances of return.
Post-execution At the very end of the function.
@begin signature
@preExec
Pre-execution code
@preReturn
Pre-return code
@postExec
Post-execution code
@end
Figure 3.1. File format specification for a gasp policy.
There are three types of policy join-points supported in eGASP. For eGASP the three policies
are pre-execution, pre-return, and post-execution. The target code is the file onto which the policy
needs to be enforced, and join-points are where the policy code needs to be inserted. These policy
types define the join-points in which code will be inserted verbatim. A description for the types of
policies is found in Table 3.1 where the join-points are defined for each policy type.
A policy engineer can write a policy for eGASP in a file with the file type extension gasp. In
a gasp file, the engineer has to define which function to enforce by providing a function signature,
and the aspect code to be inserted at the join-points specified. The format of a gasp is defined in
Figure 3.1. In this format, all of the sections need to be included for every policy type in a gasp
file.
If a policy engineer does not need to enforce any policy for a specific policy type, they may
leave that policy section blank. The policy engineer still needs to define all sections of a gasp file.
Furthermore, a policy engineer can define policies for multiple target functions in the same gasp
file by writing a full gasp specification for every policy with each section defining all parts of a
policy.
The signature of a target function has to be, verbatim, what is written in the target CUDA
code to declare the function. This includes the global or device identifiers which are
required to define a function as mentioned in Section 1.1. The eGASP program would search for
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the function that matches this signature and then proceed to insert the code at the join-points
specified.
// This placeholder is empty
// __global__ void sensitiveFunction(int *input)
// {
// }
__global__ void sensitiveFunction(int *input)
{
// This function’s body should not execute.
maliciousFunction(input);
}
Figure 3.2. Function in a comment.
A distinction has been intentionally made between pre-return and post-execution code to
fit a specific edge case of defining security policies for functions with a void return type. Any void
function can use a return statement to break out of execution early. Having such a distinction
allows a policy writer to specify different policy behaviors based on whether a target function
returns explicitly or exits from the end of execution.
Prior to any code insertion, eGASP strips away all of the comments in the target code.
Comment stripping is a standard behavior for the GNU C compiler in the preprocessing phase as
defined in the documentation [36], thus removing the comments would not affect the functionality of
the code. The reason for stripping away comments from the target program in eGASP is to prevent
a possible malicious programmer from avoiding the policy enforcement altogether. If comments are
not stripped, this form of policy enforcement circumvention would have been possible by placing
a fake function with the same signature in a comment located prior to where the actual target
function body is written in the CUDA program.
An example of a scenario where a malicious developer might attempt to avoid a policy being
enforced by eGASP through hiding in a comment is presented with the code block in Figure 3.2.
In this example, a malicious code writer knows that the security engineer has a policy to exit out
of a function prior to executing its body. The malicious user could have attempted to put an
empty placeholder function with the same signature as sensitiveFunction within comments. In
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this function body, another malicious function could be called by the programmer, resulting in
violation of the security policy.
If comments weren’t stripped away from the code, eGASP could only modify the first oc-
currence of sensitiveFunction. This would allow the malicious code writer to execute their
malicious functionality even after a policy engineer would have attempted to have this code be
enforced. Since eGASP removes all comments, the code that is commented will be removed from
the source. Stripping the comments renders such a malicious avoidance irrelevant as eGASP would
enforce the correct code and not be affected by the commented code.
3.2 Utilizing eGASP in a Development Environment
Source Code
Policy Code
eGASP Secured Code nvcc
Figure 3.3. Development workflow with eGASP.
For a CUDA developer to use eGASP in their workflow, the developer would require access to
both the source code file of the target program, and the gasp file with the policies. The process of
using eGASP in a development workflow is illustrated in Figure 3.3. The source code and gasp files
would be inputs to eGASP. Running eGASP would output a CUDA source program. This resulting
program can be compiled through nvcc instead of the original target program to obtain executable
code which has been fully enforced by the specifications defined in the gasp file.
A systems engineer in an organization can automate this process by replacing nvcc with an
alias to a script that performs all the steps in Figure 3.3 with a system-wide policy that is given by
the policy engineer. By creating such a script, using eGASP would be transparent to the developers
in the environment, and we believe this would not interfere with the process of CUDA development.
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3.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter introduced the GPU policy enforcement system eGASP with descriptions of
how to write policies and use eGASP. The possible policy join-points which can be enforced are
defined for the aspect weaver as being pre-execution, pre-return, and post-execution with reasoning
for distinguishing pre-return and post-execution being given. A file format specification for writing
policy code in a gasp file for eGASP is defined for policy engineers. There was a possible method to
avoid eGASP which was discovered during development, but the solution to that vulnerability was
described with the mitigation implemented. Lastly, the compilation steps of eGASP are described
showing what a developer would have to do to use this system.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
Examples of eGASP policies and the results of testing these policies are presented in this
chapter. First, the hardware configuration that we used to perform these tests will be presented;
this configuration can be used to reproduce tests. Then, some policies to emulate what a security
engineer might wish to enforce in various situations are evaluated. Finally, a performance analysis
of using eGASP to enforce policies compared to a manual method of code insertion will be measured.
4.1 System Configuration
Table 4.1: System configuration.
Component Specification
Operating System Arch Linux
Kernel Version 4.4.5-1-ARCH
Desktop Environment Gnome 3.18
Driver Version 361.28
CUDA release 7.5, V7.5.17
CPU Intel 2600K overclocked to 3.5 GHz base, 4.43 GHz max
GPU Nvidia GTX-580
RAM 16-GiB DDR3
All of the tests in this chapter were run on a personal desktop with the specifications detailed
on Table 4.1. A reader can reproduce the results of all of the tests presented in this chapter given
the specifications provided. This desktop was chosen due to availability of hardware at the time of
writing this thesis.
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4.2 Examples of Policies
Several policies have been written using eGASP. These policies will be listed in this section
with the utility explained. The last policy will be used to demonstrate the performance difference
between manually inserting the policy code compared to using eGASP. As was mentioned in Sec-
tion 3.1, the policy engineer needs to include all sections in a gasp file, thus all of the figures in
this chapter will include an entire gasp policy.
4.2.1 Logging
@begin __global__ void Sensitive_Global
@preExec
long long int startTime = clock64();
@preReturn
@postExec
timeLog[blockIdx.x] = clock64() - startTime;
@end
Figure 4.1. Policy to log execution time.
Logging in a common policy desired for security and policy engineers. To emulate the
functionality of logging, we wrote a policy to time the execution of the body of a function. This
policy will save the calculated execution time in an array that was passed in as a parameter. When
the policy returns, the calling code can then check the contents of the array timeLog for the results.
This gasp policy is shown in Figure 4.1.
To facilitate logging, the program had to be manually modified to pass in an array timeLog
to the function called Sensitive Global. This requires manual intervention of the developer to
allow for the policy to be enforced onto a target. A proposed method for enabling this modification
without manual intervention of the developer is explained in Section 5.3.
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@begin __global__ void Sensitive_Global
@preExec
if (blockIdx.x > 300)
{
@preReturn
@postExec
}
@end
Figure 4.2. Policy to limit blocks which execute.
4.2.2 Imposing Execution Limitations
It was decided to demonstrate how to define and enforce a safety policy through the use
of eGASP. Safety policies are policies which specify that nothing bad happens. In this policy, we
prevent the execution of a CUDA function from continuing after it violates our rules. Such a policy
would be considered to be a safety policy according to this definition. The theory behind safety
policies was described in Section 2.1.
The purpose of the proposed policy was to limit the number of CUDA blocks on which the
device code would execute. This policy can be used as a form of load limiting of code where each
block can run fully independently of each other. The method of doing this execution limiting is
performed by wrapping the body of the target function with a check of the index of the blocks. If
the check fails, then the body of the function would not execute. The execution limiting policy is
shown in Figure 4.2.
It must be noted that in order to wrap the body of the target function, a brace must be
opened in the @preExec point-cut location, and closed in the @postExec. The braces have to
be placed in such sections since eGASP inserts the advice code from the policy verbatim into the
locations specified. These braces wrap the existing body expression of the target function as the
body of an if conditional statement, as such the body would be jumped over if the condition could
not evaluate correctly.
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@begin __global__ void Sensitive_Global
@preExec
int thisID = blockIdx.x + blockIdx.y;
@preReturn
@postExec
@end
Figure 4.3. Policy to complete missing code.
4.2.3 Completing Missing Code
We designed the policy in Figure 4.3 to demonstrate that eGASP can be used outside the
realm of security policies. For educational purposes, a class teaching CUDA to beginner pro-
gramming students might wish to abstract away concepts early on from the students to ease their
learning. An example would be to only show the relative functional body of code to these students
while eliminating the concern of calculating the indexes of each thread for a later lesson.
To build a policy that that represents this classroom situation, we moved the process of
calculating the index of a CUDA block into a policy in a gasp file. Having the calculation in a
separate file allows us to abstract that portion away from the body of the CUDA code as shown in
the gasp file defined in Figure 4.3. This will allow the students to write code for CUDA that will
compile without having to worry about calculating the thread indices. The calculated index in this
policy is stored as an integer to be referenced by students as the variable thisID throughout their
code.
The gasp policy defined in Figure 4.3 can also be used for CUDA developers in a large
organization. An algorithm designer in this organization might wish to write an algorithm for
CUDA without worrying about the geometry of the kernel being called. By having the index
calculation in a separate gasp file, this designer can define the indices after fully designing their
algorithm without modifying any of their CUDA code. Furthermore the algorithm designer can
change the geometry of their algorithm when the organization purchases different hardware without
having to go into the source CUDA code.
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4.3 Performance Analysis
@begin __global__ void simple_function
@preExec
// local array to represent generated primes
int localArray[10001];
// Initialize entire array as "true"
for(int i = 0; i < 10001; i++)
localArray[i] = 1;
// Starting at 2 untill sqrt(arraysize)
for (int i = 2; i <= 100; i++)
if (localArray[i] == 1)
for (int j = i*i; j < 10001; j+= i)
// These numbers are not prime
localArray[j] = 0;
@preReturn
@postExec
@end
Figure 4.4. Performance testing code.
In this section, we will present the results of some performance tests that were performed.
To artificially introduce measurably long execution time, each CUDA block calculates the first
prime numbers which are less than 10,000 by using the Sieve of Eratosthenes. Moreover, manual
tests were performed to compare inlining the aspects of a policy against inserting function calls to
inserted functions containing policy code. The results of the performance tests described in this
section are summarized in Table 4.2.
Figure 4.4 provides the definition of the policy which was used to insert a block of code
into a test CUDA function called simple function. This policy was specifically designed to have
a slow execution time when run in order to allow us to measure if there is a significant perfor-
mance difference between using eGASP compared to manually inserting the code. To facilitate
logging, we utilized the cudaEventElapsedTime function that provides us with a resolution of 0.5
microseconds [27].
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Table 4.2: Measurement results.
Process Execution Time
Inlining a function 483.018 ms
Calling Function 485.305 ms
Calculating Sieve of Eratosthenes 480.408 ms
simple function 41.938 ms
Enforced Target 482.746 ms
At its current state of design, the eGASP weaver inlines the policy code onto the target
program. This choice to inline code was made to avoid any potential overhead of function calls
being detrimental to a target CUDA functions execution time. We have expected that the execution
time of inlining the aspect code onto a target program would not be significantly higher than that
of a target program calling the aspects in separate functions.
When we tested the runtime of inlining the policy code in Figure 4.4 to a target program
against having the policy code be placed in a separate function that gets called, the average time
to call a body of a function was 485.305 ms after 100 iterations. As for inlining, it took an average
of 483.018 ms to execute 100 iterations which is approximately 2 ms faster than using function
calls. However, with these results, we consider the difference of execution time between inlining
the policy code onto a target against calling a device function from the CUDA target code to be
insignificant, as it is less than half a percent difference in execution time.
It was expected that there would be some level of overhead to call a CUDA device function
from the CPU host. This overhead is due to how, in the CUDA framework, the CPU host needs
to transfer instructions to the GPU over a relatively slow PCI bus [27]. As such, we expected that
it would be faster to execute run code in a policy instead of having to return to a CPU to perform
operations between calls to the GPU.
In our tests of this claim we also have timed how long it would take for 100 iterations
of simple function to be called from host code and complete executing. We have found that
average execution time of simple function was 41.938 ms. The runtime of a function that only
has the contents of the policy in Figure 4.4 was found to be 480.408 ms. When we applied the
policy of generating primes upon simple function, we have found that the enforced target was less
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than the sum of execution times of a function to perform the generations and the time to execute
simple function, therefore verifying our claims.
4.4 Chapter Summary
This section provided examples of policies for a developer who intends to use eGASP. We
demonstrated policies that can be used to enforce logging, a safety policy that limits execution
based on a defined rule, and a policy that can be utilized for simplifying the process of writing
CUDA code.
We also tested the performance overhead of the code that has been enforced through the use
of eGASP. Comparing target code that has been enforced eGASP to manually inserting the policy code
and found no significant performance penalty when using eGASP. Finally, we have demonstrated
that the design choice of inlining the policy code of a gasp file onto a CUDA program, would not
have a significant detrimental effect on the performance of the target program compared to using
function calls for the policies.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPROVING THE POLICY ENFORCER
At its current state of design, the eGASP weaver is a proof-of-concept tool. Developing
our policy enforcer for CUDA has introduced difficulties since there does not appear to be an
open-source compiler available at the time of this writing [6]. To make eGASP complete either a
full-fledged CUDA compiler needs to be written, or the functionality of eGASP needs to be inserted
into an existing compiler. This chapter lists some features that can be considered to be desirable
for a policy engineer to utilize. Each of the following sub sections details a proposed feature for
eGASP and the techniques which can be used to apply such features.
5.1 Join-points Prior to Calling CUDA Functions
A potential policy type that a security engineer may wish to include when designing their
policies might require processing data prior to calling functions. This could involve running a
predetermined sequence of code prior to all of the CUDA function calls that the engineer specifies
to be targets. It is possible to find all possible entry points to a CUDA device function in a CUDA
program through an exhaustive parsing of the target programs source code.
If all the correct function calls are successfully located by traversing the tree resulting from
the parser, it may be possible to place advice code prior to a target functions calls as join-points.
The intended aspects in the policy code can be weaved in later into the target code through a
trivial inline insertion of the aspect code at the entry points located from the parser.
One proposed situation where this form of policy is more desirable than the pre-execution
policy described in Section 3.1 is in a high performance and time sensitive computer system envi-
ronment. There is a level of delay every time that a CUDA kernel is invoked from a CPU device [7].
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By having a conditional prior to entering the body of a CUDA function instead of within the body
of the CUDA function, we can avoid this delay. It may even be argued that a developer can utilize
a policy as a performance optimization can be designed through utilizing this technique.
5.2 Join-points After Returning from CUDA Functions
As in Section 5.1, the locations of the entry points to a CUDA function can be found through
parsing of the source code. Given the entry points, we can use the same process of parsing the
source code of a program to locate points from a CUDA program where target functions return.
Having join-points after returning differ from the feature in Section 5.1. The contrast would
be that, in this style of a policy, the aspect code insertion should be executed after the function
call is complete, to ensure that the advice will run after returning from the calling function. This
type of policy is not the same form as the pre-return code defined in eGASP in Section 3.1 as the
post-return style of policies target execution location exist outside of the functions body.
Post-return code can be useful for logging and post processing of data after a GPU has given
results. An example of a desirable functionality from a policy where logging can be performed is
using information given after running a CUDA kernel and use the CPU to process this data to
save to a file. This logging to a file policy cannot be written at the current state of eGASP as
eGASP only manipulates CUDA device code. This is because device code does not have access to
file operations [27].
5.3 Modifying the Arguments of a CUDA Function Signature
In the logging policy, described in Section 4.2.1, manual preprocessing was needed before
enforcing. If a policy can pass in more information to a CUDA function, a policy engineer can easily
implement logging code without manual intervention. To enforce that policy, manual intervention
was required by the developer to add a parameter to the function in various points. By empowering
the system engineer to add more arguments to a CUDA function, the system engineer can build
more diverse policy rules since the policy engineer can add an argument just for the policy for the
means of information passing.
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Conditional code execution is an example of a form of a policy where information passing
through arguments can be made possible. With this information being passed, a policy engineer
can have the policies determine behaviors based on previous states, where the state information is
saved onto the variables. These same variables can be passed to other policies to define a behavior
based on previous states.
As an example where information passing can be used in a policy, a boolean flag variable
can be passed to ensure that a code segment only executes once. This flag would be set upon the
first execution of a function to be signify that a segment has already executed. A policy within the
body of the function can now check the state of that flag to determine whether or not the function
should execute a section.
A parser can be used to find all the locations where the target function is called. Having
obtained the function call locations, we can manipulate the arguments for this function along with
the parameters in the function declaration and prototypes throughout the code. However, care must
be taken with this technique to avoid causing a conflict with other overloaded function definitions.
There exists a limitation with locating function pointers statically. Static analysis of pointers
to identify their runtime values is an undecidable problem [22]. Manual identification would be
required by the user to identify where function pointers would point to at runtime for eGASP to
enforce code with function pointers.
It might be possible that a developer has defined multiple functions with the same name
that are overloaded by the argument count of the function. If the added arguments to the target
function end up causing two functions to have the same function signature there would be a conflict
between the two functions, thus the resulting program would not compile.
One possible solution for this issue is to add empty arguments to the end of the definition of
the target function to ensure that there would not be a resulting conflict. These arguments would
exist as placeholders that have no effect on the execution of the program. If adding arguments has
created a function definition that matches an existing function, we can add more empty variables
until we ensure that the resulting function does not match any pre-defined functions.
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5.4 Handling Classes and Types
Currently, eGASP performs a blind search and replace for functions based on their signature.
It is possible that two separate classes can have functions with the exact same signature, but are
distinct themselves. Another concern arises when classes inherit from each other and they overload
the function definitions. A policy engineer would not have any way to differentiate between these
distinct functions.
It could be beneficial for a policy engineer to specify a policy where a function would have
different policy behaviors based on the function’s run-time type. For example, the policy engineer
could know that a program dictates different behaviors of a function depending on which type it is.
The policy engineer could then be more explicit in defining rules for the target program for each
type. Preserving type safety in the behavior of the program is one reason that a policy engineer
might wish to have a different set of rules per run-time type of a function.
We can utilize a join-point model inspired by AspectJ to implement the capability to handle
classes and types of a policy for eGASP. AspectJ is an aspect-oriented programming extension for
Java that has a join-point model where the run-time types of objects are checked to determine the
join-points [13]. A type checker would be needed to perform these forms of policies in eGASP to
check for the type of a CUDA function. Furthermore, dynamic type checking would also be needed
for programs that utilize polymorphic functions as the type of a function might change.
5.5 Composing Policies
The composition of a security policy through polcy combinators, combining algorithms,
enables a security engineer to design very complex policies through the combination of multiple,
simpler to write, sub-policies. Polymer is an example of an existing policy enforcement mechanism
that allows for security engineer to design the complex policies in such a way. The Polymer
policy enforcement and XACML are frameworks that allow for policy code reuse through policy
combinators [4].
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Policies in eGASP need to be defined on a per-function basis. A security engineer might wish
to enforce a policy on multiple target functions running the same behavior, or the capability to
have multiple, already defined, behaviors be used to create a new and more complex policy. The
process of enforcing multiple targets with the same behavior with eGASP currently would require
for the engineer to manually create a policy with the exact same content for every function.
Conversely, if an engineer wishes to create a new policy that is based on a composition from
an existing set of policies, the policy engineer needs to manually define the composed behavior as a
brand new policy. Neither of these processes allow for the ease of defining complex policies as there
is copious amount of manual code writing overhead to define the policies in either task. Having
these difficulties of writing large policies would make an engineer’s task of defining policies for a
large system be an acutely tedious engagement to deal with.
We believe that if eGASP was enhanced to allow for the capability of policy composition,
a policy engineer’s duty would be simplified. Composition would lend a policy engineer utilizing
eGASP the ability to pre-define small sub-policies that would encourage program modularity similar
to libraries in common languages. Furthermore, a team of policy engineers could distribute the
workload of policy definition to having a dedicated engineer for every sub-policy which will be
composed later, increasing the efficiency of policy definition.
5.6 Future Plan for Implementing Additional Features
The features which were listed in this chapter would benefit a security engineer but would
be difficult to implement without having access to a compiler’s internals. This section will serve as
a proposal for the methodology that may be used to implement the features which were mentioned
in the previous sections.
Many added features for eGASP have been shown to be desirable. Access to a CUDA
compiler’s internals would ease the development of eGASP to incorporate the features proposed in
this chapter. Being able to leverage the capabilities of the existing parser from a compiler would be
beneficial to implement the features in Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. Having access to the parse tree
would ease the process of locating entry and return points of a CUDA function, as well as allow
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eGASP to insert aspects as policy code onto these join-points of the program. Furthermore, having
such access would allow for eGASP to identify overloaded functions, thus avoiding the potential
issues which were mentioned in Section 5.3.
Access to the type checker can be utilized in for the concerns described in Section 5.4 to
identify the exact type of a function. A compiler performs static type checking to ensure that the
program would not have violations in the type system. By leveraging this type checker, we can
equip eGASP with knowledge of a target CUDA functions type to ensure that that the policies to
be enforced are in fact the types that we expect them to be. Also, we can utilize the compiler to
insert run-time checks for a functions type to allow for a policy to enforce a polymorphic function
with a behavior that is dependent on the function’s run-type.
Rules for composition need to be formally defined for eGASP. These rules need to take
into consideration the parallel nature of software running on the CUDA framework to ensure that
undefined behavior is not an accidental by-product of a policy. Finally, the composition rules need
to be clear and concise as to ensure that the resulting policy of a composition is what would be
expected by the policy engineer after writing a complex security policy.
5.7 Chapter Summary
Several desirable features were discussed in this chapter that we were unable to implement
in eGASP. These features include: join-points prior to calling a function, join-points after returning
from a function, the capability to modify a CUDA functions signature, handling polymorphic
functions in CUDA, and the ability to write policies through the processes of composing smaller
sub-policies. Enforcing code with function pointers would require that a user manually identify
what the runtime values would be.
A plan for eGASP to be extended with all of the features mentioned in this chapter was
given. In that plan, it was argued that the implementation of the desirable features can leverage
the inner workings of a CUDA compiler. To utilize the inner workings, it is also vital that the
source code of the compiler be freely available for the ease of implementing the proposed features
for eGASP.
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CHAPTER 6
FUTURE WORK AND SUMMARY
In this chapter we will present what we believe are the next steps to progress with research
on GPGPU security policies. Opportunities for research on CUDA policy design are listed as future
work. We will be presenting a competing platform to CUDA and explain why we believe we can
apply eGASP to that platform. Lastly, we will provide a summary of the writing presented thesis.
6.1 Future Work
We have demonstrated a few policies utilizing eGASP to enforce CUDA programs in Chap-
ter 4. More policies need to be created and tested for CUDA using eGASP. Further testing to identify
what styles of policies a security engineer would be beneficial to identify the realm of policies which
can be applied to a GPGPU.
There were some more policy types that we wished to implement in eGASP aside from the
ones listed in Section 3.1. We have listed out the desired policy types in Chapter 5. It was also
argued that it would be possible to implement the features if we had an open source compiler in a
detailed plan that we have laid out in Section 5.6.
Implementing the open-source compiler would also provide another security improvement.
As the last step of building a program with eGASP involves utilizing the nvcc compiler, ultimately
we are left to trust nvcc to handle the output code. Without a means to verify the compiler, we
are not capable to fully trust the output [37]. Having the source of the compiler would allow us to
verify, within a reasonable certainty, that the compiler in itself is not malicious.
During the design of eGASP, we have considered making eGASP work as a parallel enabled
Execution Monitor running alongside of other processes. As was described in Section 2.1, Execution
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Monitors are a class of enforcement mechanisms that monitor the execution steps of a target and
terminate the target upon policy violation. We wished for this Execution Monitor to monitor
multiple tasks at the same time. Unfortunately, as we describe in the following paragraph, we
cannot have an Execution Monitor.
In CUDA, threads on a grid run concurrently to each other. These threads cannot exe-
cute code where the execution path could diverge [27]. As such, we have argued that if a single
thread violates a policy while the remaining threads do not, we cannot target only singular thread
for a remedial action. Also, due to high degree of parallelism of GPGPUs, it would be difficult
to synchronize execution an Execution Monitor without incurring massive amount is introduced
slowdown.
We have looked at other parallel computation modules for this concept. Intel provides its
own family of highly parallel computation platform as a competitor to CUDA and OpenCL. The
Intel Xeon Phi family of coprocessors allows for highly parallel computation through traditional
programming languages and techniques [16]. With the Phi coprocessor, a programmer has a higher
degree of flexibility of design of their programs. While in CUDA we are limited to stream processing,
with the Intel Phi we are allowed a larger amount of flexibility to decide on programming models.
In the Phi coprocessor there are far fewer cores than in a GPGPU. Compared to the 3072
cores in the current top-end consumer GPU, the top end Intel Phi has 61 cores [16]. These cores
also have fewer threads per core than in a GPU. Overall the total thread count would be much
lower on a Phi than on a GPU, thus reducing the degree of parallelism.
Nevertheless, each of the cores on a Phi are based on standard Intel processors in the
underlying design, inheriting several desired attributes. The processing cores of a Phi can execute
the same instruction set as a traditional x86 processors. This permits a programmer the capability
to write a program which runs on a CPU and is binary compatible with a Phi coprocessor.
Phi allows for parallelism through the SIMD style of computing architecture to enable for
stream processing capabilities. A programmer can write software targeting the Phi using stream
processing using OpenCL as well. Programming in OpenCL allows for a developer to have the
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capability of writing the same of programs for a GPGPU to run on a Phi, albeit with a much lower
level of parallelism.
An Intel Phi does have the benefit of being more flexible than GPGPUs. It is possible
for a developer to treat each core of a Phi as its own host in a cluster. This is due to how in a
Phi, each core can run a micro Linux operating system in an internal, high speed, network. As
such, the Phi opens opportunities to utilize standard methods of parallel computing on a single
device. An example is the message passing interface which allows for parallel computation through
a distributed computing platform [3].
Through utilizing an Intel Phi coprocessor we propose that we can build a more capable
policy enforcement mechanism than eGASP at its current state. The enforcement mechanism can
run in parallel to the target code running on the same coprocessor. This proposed enforcement
mechanism can be designed to be a dedicated execution monitor running as its own thread on the
Phi.
We believe that it can be possible for this parallel execution monitor to performing checks
on multiple, independent, processes running on the Phi. Furthermore, since each core of the Phi
operates with its own micro operating system, the cores have native support for file operations.
Native file operations will enable the policy designer with the capability of having a distributed
logging policy.
Finally, we know that the Phi can be programmed using standard C [16]. Also, we can
compile programs designed to target the Phi using the GCC compiler. Since we have the full
source code of GCC to work with, applying all of the features of eGASP as well as the features listed
in Chapter 5 is would be possible for the Phi.
6.2 Summary
General Purpose Graphics Processing Units are high performance processing devices. We
have identified existing and theoretical security attacks involving GPGPUS. Some of those attacks
have even utilized a GPGPU as an aid to hide their malicious executions.
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The field of aspect-oriented programming as a paradigm to increase software modularity
was presented. Aspect-oriented programming techniques were used to create our security policy
enforcement mechanism called eGASP. We have demonstrated some policies to not only enforce
security policies, but also to ease the development process of an engineer who would utilize CUDA.
The policies which we have demonstrated present a policy engineer with examples as how to write
logging behavior, execution limiting, and missing code completion.
Performance analysis was performed on CUDA code to justify design decisions of eGASP.
We have found that inserting code through inline, the method that eGASP uses to enforce policies,
is faster to execute than executing two separate CUDA functions. Also, we have found that our de-
cision of inlining policies caused no significant performance penalties, compared to placing function
calls to policy code.
We have presented a list of features that we wish to add on to eGASP. Through that feature
list we have argued for the necessity of an open-source compiler for CUDA. As we have demonstrated
throughout this thesis, it is enforcing security policies on a GPGPU was made possible through
aspect-oriented programming. It is anticipated that through the results of this work, we could
provide a long term goal for researching security policies and applying those security policies towards
parallel and distributed computing.
35
REFERENCES
[1] Bader AlBassam. GH0S1R33P0R/eGASP: enforcing GPUs through Aspect Style Program-
ming. https://github.com/GH0S1R33P0R/eGASP, 2016.
[2] Evan Andersen. How Nvidia breaks Chrome Incognito. https://charliehorse55.wordpress.com/
2016/01/09/how-nvidia-breaks-chrome-incognito, 2016 (accessed February 09, 2016).
[3] Blaise Barney. Message Passing Interface (MPI). https://computing.llnl.gov/tutorials/mpi/,
2016 (accessed May 08, 2016).
[4] Lujo Bauer, Jay Ligatti, and David Walker. Composing security policies with polymer. In
ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation, pages
305–314. ACM, 2005.
[5] Jonathan Beard. A short intro to stream processing. http://www.jonathanbeard.io/blog/
2015/09/19/streaming-and-dataflow.html, 2015 (accessed February 15, 2016).
[6] Eli Bendersky, Mark Heffernan, Chris Leary, Jacques Pienaar, Bjarke Roune, Rob Springer,
Jingyue Wu, Xuetian Weng, Artem Belevich, and Robert Hundt. GPUCC: An Open-
Source GPGPU Compiler. http://images.nvidia.com/events/sc15/pdfs/SC5105-open-source-
cuda-compiler.pdf, 2015 (accessed March 25, 2016).
[7] Michael Boyer. CUDA Kernel Overhead. http://www.cs.virginia.edu/∼mwb7w/cuda support/
kernel overhead.html, (accessed April 14, 2016).
[8] Robert Clucas and Stephen Levitt. CAPP: A C++ aspect-oriented based framework for
parallel programming with OpenCL. In Annual Research Conference on South African Institute
of Computer Scientists and Information Technologists. ACM, 2015.
36
[9] Nicodemos Damianou, Naranker Dulay, Emil Lupu, and Morris Sloman. The ponder pol-
icy specification language. In Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks, pages 18–38.
Springer, 2001.
[10] Matteo DellA´mico, Gabriel Serme, Muhammad Sabir Idrees, Anderson Santana de Olivera, and
Yves Roudier. HiPoLDS: A security policy language for distributed systems. In Information
Security Theory and Practice. Security, Privacy and Trust in Computing Systems and Ambient
Intelligent Ecosystems, volume 7322, pages 97–112. Springer, 2012.
[11] Michael J. Flynn. Some computer organizations and their effectiveness. IEEE Transactions
on Computers, C-21(9):948–960, Sept 1972.
[12] Andrea Fornaia, Christian Napoli, Giuseppe Pappalardo, and Emiliano Tramontana. An AO
system for OO–GPU programming. In Workshop “From Object to Agents” (WOA15), volume
1382, pages 24–31, 2015.
[13] The Eclipse Foundation. The AspectJ project. http://www.eclipse.org/aspectj, (accessed April
14, 2016).
[14] Simon Godik, Anne Anderson, Bill Parducci, P Humenn, and S Vajjhala. Oasis eXtensible
Access Control 2 Markup Language (XACML) 3. Technical report, OASIS, 2002.
[15] Intel. Intel Core i7-6700K processor (8m cache, up to 4.20 GHz) specifications. http://ark.intel.
com/products/88200/Intel-Core-i7-6700T-Processor-8M-Cache-up-to-3 60-GHz, 2016 (ac-
cessed February 17, 2016).
[16] Intel. Intel Xeon Phi Product Family: Product Brief. http://www.intel.com/content/www/
us/en/high-performance-computing/high-performance-xeon-phi-coprocessor-brief.html, (ac-
cessed May 08, 2016).
[17] Lalana Kagal, T Finin, and A Joshi. Rei: A policy specification language. http://rei.umbc.edu,
2005 (accessed February 8, 2016).
37
[18] Kamran Karimi, Neil G Dickson, and Firas Hamze. A performance comparison of CUDA and
OpenCL. arXiv preprint arXiv:1005.2581, 2010.
[19] Gregor Kiczales, John Lamping, Anurag Mendhekar, Chris Maeda, Cristina Lopes, Jean-Marc
Loingtier, and John Irwin. Aspect-oriented programming. In European Conference on Object-
Oriented Programming, pages 220–242. Springer, 1997.
[20] Calvin Ko, Manfred Ruschitzka, and Karl Levitt. Execution monitoring of security-critical
programs in distributed systems: A specification-based approach. In Symposium on Security
and Privacy, pages 175–187. IEEE, 1997.
[21] Leslie Lamport. Proving the correctness of multiprocess programs. IEEE Transactions on
Software Engineering, 3(2):125–143, 1977.
[22] William Landi. Undecidability of static analysis. ACM Letters on Programming Languages
and Systems, 1(4):323–337, December 1992.
[23] Jay Ligatti, Lujo Bauer, and David Walker. Run-time enforcement of nonsafety policies. ACM
Transactions on Information and System Security, 12(3):1–41, 2009.
[24] E. Lindholm, J. Nickolls, S. Oberman, and J. Montrym. NVIDIA Tesla: A Unified Graphics
and Computing Architecture. IEEE Micro, 28(2):39–55, March 2008.
[25] B Medeiros, R Silva, and JL Sobral. Gaspar: a compositional aspect-oriented approach for
cluster applications. Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience, 2015.
[26] Nvidia. What is GPU computing? high-performance computing. http://www.nvidia.com/
object/what-is-gpu-computing.html, 2007 (accessed February 15, 2016).
[27] Nvidia. programming guide::cuda toolkit documentation. http://docs.nvidia.com/cuda/cuda-
c-programming-guide, 2015 (accessed February 15, 2016).
[28] Nvidia. GeForce GTX Titan X specifications. http://www.geforce.com/hardware/desktop-
gpus/geforce-gtx-titan-x/specifications, 2015 (accessed February 17, 2016).
38
[29] Jonathan Passerat-Palmbach, Pierre Schweitzer, Jonathan Caux, Pridi Siregar, Claude Mazel,
and David R.C. Hill. Harnessing Aspect Oriented Programming on GPU: Application to
Warp–Level Parallelism (WLP). International Journal of Computer Aided Engineering and
Technology, 7(2):158–175, 2015.
[30] Daniel Reynaud. GPU Powered Malware. In Ruxcon, Sydney, Australia, November 2008.
[31] Dennis Ritchie and Ken Thompson. The UNIX time-sharing system. The Bell System Technical
Journal, 57(6):1905–1929, July 1978.
[32] Phil Savage. ESEA release malware into public client, forcing users to farm Bitcoins
[updated]. http://www.pcgamer.com/esea-accidentally-release-malware-into-public-client-
causing-users-to-farm-bitcoins, 2013 (accessed February 18, 2016).
[33] Fred B Schneider. Enforceable security policies. ACM Transactions on Information and System
Security, 3(1):30–50, 2000.
[34] M Sloman, N Dulay, and B Nuseibeh. SecPol: Specification and analysis of security policy
for distributed systems. http://www-dse.doc.ic.ac.uk/Projects/secpol/SecPol-overview.html,
1998 (accessed February 8, 2016).
[35] Morris Sloman and Kevin Twidle. Domains: A framework for structuring management policy.
In System Objects, SIGOIS Bulletin, pages 171–184, 1992.
[36] Richard M. Stallman. The C Preprocessor. https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-2.95.3/cpp 1.
html, 2001 (accessed April 12, 2016).
[37] Ken Thompson. Reflections on trusting trust. Communications of the ACM, 27(8):761–763,
1984.
[38] Mahesh V. Tripunitara and Eugene H. Spafford. Security policy communication in a dis-
tributed network element. In International Conference on Advanced Communication Technol-
ogy. ICACT, 1999.
39
[39] Wei-Tek Tsai, Xinxin Liu, and Yinong Chen. Distributed policy specification and enforce-
ment in service-oriented business systems. In IEEE International Conference on e-Business
Engineering, pages 10–17. IEEE, 2005.
[40] Kevin Twidle, Naranker Dulay, Emil Lupu, and Morris Sloman. Ponder2: A policy system
for autonomous pervasive environments. In Fifth International Conference On Autonomic and
Autonomous Systems, pages 330–335. IEEE, 2009.
[41] Giorgos Vasiliadis, Michalis Polychronakis, and Sotiris Ioannidis. GPU-assisted malware. In-
ternational Journal of Information Security, 14(3):289–297, 2015.
[42] Mingliang Wang and Manish Parashar. Object-oriented stream programming using aspects.
In IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing, pages 1–11. IEEE,
2010.
40
